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MIXED MOTIVES: REGARDING RACE AND
RACIAL FORTUITY
SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN v. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES
FOR RACIAL REFORM. By Derrick Bell. 1 Oxford
University Press. 2004. Pp. 230. Hardback, $25.00, Paper,
$14.95.
Kathleen A. Bergin 2

I

INTRODUCTION

In April 2006, the Nebraska state legislature passed the
Learning Community Reorganization Act to improve the faltering educational system in Omaha City. 3 Rejecting a bid to merge
majority-white suburban districts with the mostly minority city
4
schools, the legislature instead voted to divide the formerly unified Omaha City School System into three separate and
autonomous school districts. 5 The perimeter of each new district
would track existing residential attendance zones used to deter6
mine enrollment in local high schools under the unified system.
As a result, the racial composition of the student body at any
one school within Omaha City would likely change little, if at all,
under the reconstituted plan. Nearly every school in the city could
1. Visiting Professor of Law, New York University Law School.
2. Associate Professor, South Texas College of Law. J.D., University of Baltimore;
LL.M., New York University. Special thanks to Derrick Bell, Brian Bix and Shelby A.D.
Moore for helpful comments that improved this review.
3. 2006 Neb. Laws 1024, §§ 28-41.
4. See News Hour: Plan for Omaha Schools Raises Segregation Concerns (PBS
television broadcast May 31, 2006), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb
/education/jan-june06/omaha_05-3l.html (hereinafter News Hour].
5. !d.; see also Megan Tady, 'Re-segregated' Omaha Schools to be Separate, Not
Equal, THE NEW STANDARD, Apr. 21, 2006, http://newstandardnews.net/content/index.
cfrnlitems/3082.
6. 2006 Neb. Laws 1024, § 41; see also Scott Bauer, Omaha Schools Split along
Race Lines, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 13, 2006, http://www.boston.cornlnews/nation/
articles/2006/04/13/omaha_schools_split_along_race_lines.
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very well remain what each had become in 1999 when Omaha discontinued compliance with a judicial desegregation order: predominantly Black, largely Hispanic, or uniformly White. 7
The NAACP cried "segregation," and filed sui~ against a
plan that it says "violat[es] the bedrock constitutional principle"
embodied in Brown v. Board of Education 8 by creating racially
identifiable school districts. 9 But Ernie Chamber, sponsor of the
plan and Nebraska's only Black state senator, quickly pointed
out that Omaha schools were already segregated, and that his
proposal did nothing more than alter the governing structure of
existing schools by creating three new school boards and Super10
intendent positions. Doing so, Chambers defended, would
likely bring about much needed improvements to the city's faltering Black and Latino schools by giving minority communities
a governing voice over educational policy. 11
Senator Chambers will find a sympathetic ally in Derrick
Bell, author of Silent Covenants, who views the contemporary
status of America's schools as evidence that Brown's "current
relevance is in doubt" (p. 131). Bell spent the better part of his
legal career in the 1960s with the NAACP's Legal Defense
Fund, seeking to implement Brown's landmark ruling that seg7. See News Hour, supra note 4. In 1975, the City of Omaha was placed under a
court ordered desegregation plan pursuant to a finding that it had previously engaged in
unconstitutional segregation. See United States v. School Dist., 521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir.
1975). By 1984, the school system had obtained "unitary" status in compliance with the
1975 order. The district court suspended judicial supervision of the school district but
ordered that it continue to operate a unitary system. Omaha proceeded to implement the
original desegregation plan voluntarily until1999. See Complaint, NAACP v. Heineman,
No. 06 Civ. 371 (D. Neb. filed May 16, 2006) [hereinafter Complaint].
8. 347 u.s. 483 (1954).
9. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 5, para. 14; see also Sam Dillon, Law to Segregate Omaha Schools Divides Nebraska, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2006, at A9, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/15/us/15omaha.html?ei=5090&en=613ee064f4b5fefa&e
x=1302753600&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&pagewanted=all; Kevin Tibbles, A Return to Racial Segregation in Schools?, MSNBC.COM, Apr. 19, 2006, http://www.
msnbc.msn.corn!id/12394410/frorn!RL.4.
10. See News Hour, supra note 4; Tady, supra note 5 (quoting Chambers's comment
that in Omaha City "you have students sitting in a segregated school in a segregated
neighborhood asking if this bill is going to bring about segregation"). The NAACP states
in its Complaint that the majority of Omaha's Latino and African American population
live in segregated neighborhoods wherein students are assigned to neighborhood schools.
Complaint, supra note 7, at 7--8, paras. 22, 27, 28.
11. Senator Chambers stated that "[t]he real issue is one of power. We believe that
the people whose children attend schools ought to have local control over those schools,
a concept very familiar with white people." News Hour, supra note 4; see also James
Wright, Omaha Plan: Is It Segregation?, BLACKPRESSUSA.COM, http://www.blackpressusa.
corn!News/Article.asp?SID=3&Title=National+News&NewsiD=8100.
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regated schools violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (pp. 97-106). The task was formidable.
White resistance to desegregation was so severe that Bell required the protection of federal marshalls to escort him to and
from court. His clients were shot at, their homes firebombed,
and he, along with them, slept under armed guard (pp. 99-103).
At one point, Bell supervised over 300 desegregation cases simultaneously, pressing what he would later lament as Brown's
misplaced "integrationist" ideal (p. 105). 12
Bell now rejects the decision he once nearly died to defend,
maintaining in Silent Covenants that the Court should have upheld the "separate but equal" standard established in Plessy v.
Ferguson. 13 According to Professor Bell, the Court in Brown
changed the constitutional status of segregated schools, but
lacked the institutional capacity to address the culture of White
14
supremacy behind those schools (pp. 94-96). Had he been on
the Court in 1954, Bell would have conceded the "limits of judicial authority" and cited the "predictable outraged resistance" of
Whites as reasons for upholding segregation (p. 21). 15 At the
same time, he would have acknowledged the "long-suppressed
12. See also Derrick A. Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client In·
terests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 516 (1976) [hereinafter Bell,
Integration Ideals].
13. 163 u.s. 537 (1896).
14. Professor Bell's criticism of Brown pre-dates Silent Covenants. See, e.g., Derrick
A. Bell, Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,
93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524-25 (1980) (describing political and economic interests as primary motivations for promoting Black equality in Brown); Bell, Integration Ideals, supra
note 12 (arguing that civil rights lawyers blindly pursued integration following Brown
without considering the educational interest of their clients). Subsequent writings reiter·
ate the view taken in Silent Covenants that Brown's contemporary impact is largely overstated. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, The Unintended Lessons in Brown v. Board of Education, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1053, 1053 (2005) ("The Brown decision, as far as the law is
concerned, is truly dead and beyond resuscitation."); Derrick Bell, Relearning Brown:
Applying the Lessons of Brown to the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century, 29 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE, 633, 634 (2005) (describing Brown as "a magnificent mirage,
the legal equivalent of that city on a hill to which all aspire without any serious thought
that it will ever be attained"); Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education: Reliving and
Learning from Our Racial History, 66 U. PIIT. L. REV. 21,21 (2004) ("The Brown Decision, while never overturned, has become irrelevant.").
15. In 2001, Professor Bell contributed to a compilation of "decisions" written by
prominent legal scholars and civil rights activists that reflected how they would have decided Brown had they sat on the bench in 1954. The authors were asked to draft their
opinions in light of what they perceived to be the contemporary relevance and historical
impact of Brown. Professor Bell drafted the only dissenting opinion. See Derrick A. Bell,
Bell,]., Dissenting, in WHAT "BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION" SHOULD HAVE SAID,
THE NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS
DECISION 185-200 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) [hereinafter Bell, J., Dissenting]. That dis·
sent is reprinted in Silent Covenants (pp. 21-27).
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truth" that Plessy was seldom enforced, and would have demanded strict compliance with its "separate but equal" standard
16
(pp. 21-24). This approach would have provided legal recourse
against substandard segregated schools and spared Black children the emotional agony and physical abuse they experienced
from hostile Whites upon being transferred to hostile White
schools (p. 112). Moreover, he writes, the approach would have
ultimately led to popular support for desegregation as an economic imperative that served the financial interests of Whites by
cutting the costs of funding two separate school systems (pp. 2427).17
This Essay reviews the critique articulated against Brown in
Silent Covenants. Part II describes the phenomenon of "racial
fortuity" responsible, in Professor Bell's view, for patterns of racial reform and retrenchment following Brown and other civil
rights milestones. Within that Part, section A examines the political environment leading up to Brown, while section B discusses how this likely influenced the Justices deliberations. The
discussion shows that Brown reflects a primary example of "interest-convergence" that advanced the nation's foreign policy
objectives without a sufficiently meaningful commitment to racial equality or educational reform. Section C examines the role
of "racial-sacrifice" in Brown that arguably preserved public
school segregation in practice even after the Court ruled it unconstitutional under law. Part III situates Brown within a
broader historical context by examining the role of racial fortuity
in major events that both pre- and post-date the decision. It explains how the short-term advantages of racial fortuity interfere
with long-term progress towards actual racial justice and equality. Part IV explains how racial fortuity not only disadvantages
minority interests, but undermines the independent role of the
judiciary. It also introduces the concept of "forged fortuity" as
an alternative strategy for promoting meaningful racial progress

16. See also Bell, 1., Dissenting, supra note 15, at 185-93.
17. See also Bell, 1., Dissenting, supra note 15, at 196--98. But see Lia B. Epperson,
True Integration: Advancing Brown's Goal of Educational Equity in the Wake ofGrutter,
67 U. PITI. L. REv. 175, 196 (2005) ("[C]ritiques (from Bell] fail to examine some of the
real challenges that were inherent in advocating for educational opportunities for African-American children in an era when our country still sanctioned an apartheid regime in
the South."); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, For Whom Does the Bell TolL· The Bell Tolls for
Brown?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1507, 1523-33 (2005) (questioning whether Bell's alternative
scenario would have resulted in voluntary desegregation) (hereinafter Onwuachi-Willig,
For Whom Does the Bell Toll?].
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within the existing political framework. Part VI concludes optimistically that a commitment to forged fortuity may ultimately
reconceptualize society on more equitable and just terms.
II. RACIAL FORTUITY AND THE QUEST FOR
DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY IN BROWN
Professor Bell's critique of Brown takes into account the
role of "racial fortuity" in determining the social, economic and
political fortunes of Blacks and other racial minorities. He describes the phenomenon of racial fortuity as a two-part formula.
First, according to Professor Bell, policymakers throughout history have willingly sacrificed "basic entitlements of freedom and
justice" (p. 9) for Blacks in order to resolve economic and political differences among competing groups of Whites (pp. 9, 69).
Second, policymakers will recognize and remedy racial injustices
only when such action "will benefit the nation's interests without
significantly diminishing whites' sense of entitlement" (p. 9). 18
The pace of racial progress is thus dictated by repetitive cycles of
"racial sacrifice" and moments of "interest-convergence."
Silent Covenants explains Brown's pronouncement against
segregated schools and the subsequent difficulty in implementing desegregation as a prime example of racial fortuity in a decision that promoted Black equality to meet a different end. What
motivated the outcome in Brown and other mid-century civil
rights gains, says Professor Bell, was a realization that America
could not proclaim the moral superiority of democratic governance over Soviet styled communism while tolerating the South's
apartheid regime (pp. 59-68). The outcome in Brown was never
about integration or better schools, he says. Brown, at bottom,
was about the Cold War. 19
A. COLD WAR PRECURSORS TO BROWN
The Cold War was the Court's "unacknowledged motivation" in Brown (pp. 60-67). In the years preceding the decision,
18. See also p. 49; Mary L. Dudziak, Brown as a Cold War Case, 91 J. AMER. HIST.
32, 34 (2004), ("[C]ivil rights reform is not a straightforward tale of a struggle for justice,
but a complex story that includes self-interest and limited commitments.").
19. The Cold War influence on Brown has been the focus of increased scholarly
attention in recent years. See, e.g., AZZA SALAMA LAYTON, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
AND CIVIL RIGHTS POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1941-1960, 115-17 (2000); Kathleen A. Bergin, Authenticating American Democracy, 26 PACE L. REV. 397 (2006); Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Brown v. Board of Education in International Context 36
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 493 (2004).
'

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

276

[Vol. 23:271

communist expansion into Eastern Europe and Asia threatened
global stability and the interests of United States' allies abroad. 20
Yet Americans, emotionally drained and financially strapped
from hard-fought battles in Europe and Japan, would not support military intervention against the Soviet Union. 21 President
Truman thus adopted a strategy of peaceful communist containment, relying on diplomacy and strategic alliances to nudge
newly independent ~ost-colonial nations towards a democratic
form of government. 2
Key to the "Truman Doctrine" was the United States' ability to lead by example-to showcase to the world its own commitment to self-governance zrremised on the principles of fairness, justice and equality. Domestic segregation naturally
tarnished America's international reputation, leading to efforts
by the state department to convey a positive message about race
relations abroad (pp. 60-61). Publications of the United States
Information Agency showcased the "tremendous pace" at which
democratic societies progressed by juxtaposing the conditions of
free Blacks at mid-century to the degradation they experienced
24
under slavery. Broadcasts on Voice of America Radio carried
the speeches of Black attaches dispatched to foreign nations by
the State Department to speak of their amicable relationships
with Whites and the rights available to them in the American
South (pp. 60-61). 25 Alongside its efforts to downplay the impact
of domestic segregation abroad, the Executive Branch emphasized to White Americans how segregation undermined the nation's standing in the world. Professor Bell describes a statement
made by Chester Bowles, ambassador to India, in a 1952 speech
at Yale University:
A year, a month, or even a week in Asia is enough to convince any perceptive American that the colored peoples of
Asia and Africa, who total two-thirds of the world's popula-

20. See ROGERS. WHITCOMB, THE COLD WAR IN RETROSPECT: THE FORMATIVE
YEARS 66-75 (1998); JOHN W. YOUNG, ET AL, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SINCE 1945:
A GLOBAL HISTORY, 59-{iO (2004).
21. See DANIEL YERGIN, SHATTERED PEACE, THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR
AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE 282--83 (1977).
22. See WHITCOMB, supra note 20, at 91-99; YOUNG, supra note 20, at 68-72.
23. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 12, 26-27 (2002) (hereinafter DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL
RIGHTS).
24.
25.

See id. at 49-54.
See id. at 56-57.
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tions, seldom think about the United States without considering the limitation under which our 13 million Negroes are living (p. 64).

The Executive department refused to countenance any
criticism of America's racial policies at the international level,
however, taking drastic measures to hide America's harsh treatment towards Blacks (pp. 62-64). Paul Robeson, Josephine
Baker and Louis Armstrong are just a few of the influential public figures who found themselves subject to federal surveillance
after speaking out against domestic segregation to international
audiences. 26 At a speech in Paris in 1949, Robeson compared the
racial policies of the United States "to that of Hitler and Goebbels," and warned that Blacks would never take up arms for the
United States against the Soviet Union. 27 The State Department
concluded that Robeson's "frequent criticism of the treatment of
blacks in the United States should not be aired in foreign countries" and considered his travel abroad "contrary to the best interests of the United States." 28 The Department rescinded Robeson's passport, which it later offered to re-issue only if Robeson
29
agreed to keep silent. He refused. Baker and Armstrong experienced equally debilitating government harassment. 30
Anti-communist hysteria prompted the NAACP to distance
itself from out-spoken Blacks for fear that the organization itself
would be charged with subversive affiliations (p. 63). It also influenced the rhetoric of anti-segregation. 31 In 1950, the NAACP
adopted a resolution to "eradicate [communist] infiltration ...
and expel any unit, which ... comes under Communist or other
political control and action." 32 The NAACP adopted this resolution, along with a similar one the following year, to assuage suspicion it had attracted three years earlier when it petitioned the
United Nations to investigate racial violence in the South. The
NAACP's 1947 "Appeal to the World" condemned domestic ra-

26. See id. at 61-77.
27. See id. at 62.
28. ld.
29. MARTIN DOBERMAN, PAUL ROBESON: A BIOGRAPHY 389 (1995).
30. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 66-77.
31. Even prior to World War II, the NAACP solicited support from Whites by reminding them that their defense of racial equality would undermine Communist criticism
against the Untied States. See MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY
AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950, at 38 (1987) (hereinafter TUSHNET,
LEGAL STRATEGY].
32. See Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregalion as a Cold War lmpermive, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 61,76 (1988) (alterations in original) (hereinafter Dudziak, Cold War lmperalive].
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cial discrimination as "not only indefensible but barbaric," and
tagged southern lawmakers, as opposed to the Soviet Union, as
the real enemy to Blacks. 33 The U.S. delegation blocked a Soviet
proposal to investigate the petition, and Eleanor Roosevelt, then
a Board member of the NAACP, threatened to resign her position as a member of the United Nation's delegation if any nation
formally considered it (p. 62). A subsequent petition submitted
in 1951 by William Patterson, chairperson of the Civil Rights
Congress, accused the United States of committing genocide
against Blacks "as the result of the consistent, conscious, unified
policies of every branch of government." 34 The United Nations
again declined to respond, but petitions such as these kept the
spotlight on an issue that already captured world-wide attention.
Foreign publications and news bureaus ensured that citizens
abroad, as well as governments, understood the hypocrisy of
American racism. 35 In 1946, a widely read Soviet publication editorialized that the American South was experiencing a rise in
"'terroristic acts against negroes,' including 'the bestial mobbing
of four negroes by a band of 20 to 25 whites,'" and '"a crowd of
white men [who] tortured a negro war veteran, ... tore his arms
out and set fire to his body."' It emphasized that '"the murder36
ers, even though they are identified, remain unpunished. "' Particularly damaging to America's global reputation were attacks
on Black World War II veterans who attempted to exercise the
democratic freedoms they fought for abroad-the right to equal
treatment and the right to vote (p. 61 ). International news coverage of America's horrid treatment towards Blacks was so extensive that in 1949 the American Embassy in Moscow warned
that '"the 'Negro question' [was o]ne of the principal Soviet
37
propaganda themes regarding the United States."'
Persistent outrages involving government officials made it
impossible to discount Southern racism as an episodic or regional anomaly that occurred outside the sanction of law. Professor Bell describes how Senator Glen Taylor, Henry Wallace's
33. W.E.B. DuBois, An Appeal to the World (1947), reprinted in W.E.B. DuBOIS
SPEAKS: SPEECHES AND ADDRESSES, 1920-1963, at 202, 202-21 (Philip S. Foner ed.,
1970).
34. See DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 64.
35. See Dudziak, Cold War Imperative, supra note 32, at 80-93.
36. See id. at 88 (quoting Dispatch No. 355, from Am. Embassy, Moscow, U.S.S.R.,
to Dep't of State (Aug. 26, 1946)).
37. See id. at 89 (quoting Dispatch No. 355, from Am. Embassy, Moscow, U.S.S.R.,
to Dep't of State (Aug. 26, 1946)) (alteration in original).
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vice-presidential running mate, was arrested when he tried to
cross the "colored" entrance to a church in Birmingham, Alabama (p. 62). In other instances, White business owners in
38
Washington D.C. refused to service Black diplomats. These occurrences also caught international attention and strained diplomatic relations.
President Truman understood the cost of domestic racism to
his global public relations campaign. He thus invoked executive
authority to expand the rights of Blacks by desegregating the
military and prohibiting discrimination in federal employment
(p. 73). Despite his urging, however, Southern segregationists
who held key committee positions in Congress blocked broader
legislative reform. 39 Absent congressional support or executive
authority to act unilaterally, Truman's only alternative avenue of
reform rested with the judiciary. 40 In a series of cases prior to
Brown, he authorized the Justice Department to intervene as
amicus and ask the Court to reverse Plessy by holding segregation unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. 41 A
constitutional pronouncement against segregation would be indispensable to the Cold War effort. It would apply to every region in the country and provide confirmation, at least symbolically, that a nation founded on democratic principles truly
recognized no class or caste among its citizens. It is here, Professor Bell explains, that the Cold War objectives of the Executive
Branch fortuitously merged with the campaign for racial justice
being pursued simultaneously by the NAACP (p. 59).

38. See id. at 9G-91.
39. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 82-83.
40. See KEVIN J. MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE: HOW THE
PRESIDENCY PAVED THE ROAD TO BROWN 192 (2004) (describing Truman's reliance on
the judiciary as a means to circumvent legislative obstruction on civil rights issues).
41. In each of these cases, the Justice Department invoked international considerations against segregation. See Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at
12, McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950) and
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) ("If the imprimatur of constitutionality should be
put on such a denial of equality, one would expect the foes of democracy to exploit such
an action for their own purposes."); Brief for the United States at 61, Henderson v.
United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) (identifying criticisms that "typify the manner in
which racial discrimination in this country is turned against us in the international field");
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 19-20, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948) ("The existence of discrimination against minority groups in this country has an
adverse effect upon our relations with other countries.").
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B. COLD WAR CONVERGENCE IN BROWN

The Justices did not discuss the Cold War implications of
racial segregation during their judicial conferences on Brown.42
There is strong evidence, however, that their deliberations were
at least in part influenced by the impact racial segregation had
on the nation's security interests. President Truman authorized
the Department of Justice to submit an amicus brief in Brown to
emphasize this very point. 43 The brief asked the Court to consider the problem of racial discrimination "in the context of the
present world struggle between freedom and tyranny." 44 It explained that:
The United States is under constant attack in the foreign
press, over the foreign radio, and in such international bodies
as the United Nations because of various practices of discrimination against minority groups in this country .... [T]he
undeniable existence of racial discrimination gives unfriendly
governments the most effective kind of ammunition for their
45
propaganda warfare (p. 65).

The brief described southern segregation and racial violence as
"existing flaws" in the American political system that "jeopardize[ d) the effective maintenance of our moral leadership of the
46
free and democratic nations of the world" (pp. 65-66).
International security concerns placed prominently in the
briefs of other amicus parties as well, including the American
Civil Liberties Union, the American Federation of Teachers, the
American Jewish Congress, and the American Veterans Committee.47 These organizations agreed with the position taken by
the Department of Justice and stated expressly by the NAACP
in its brief, that "[s]urvival of our country in the present interna42. See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940--1985): THE PRIVATE
DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 644-69 (Del Dickson
ed., 2001) (hereinafter CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS).
43. Briefs and transcripts of the oral arguments in Brown I and Brown II are compiled in 49-49A LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper
eds., 1975) (hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS).
44. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 [hereinafter DOJ Brief], reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 43, at
116, 121.
45. DOJ Brief at 7, supra note 44, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 43,
at 122.
46. DOJ Brief at 8, supra note 44, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 43,
at 123.
47. See Bergin, supra note 19, at 407-11.
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tional situation is inevitably tied to resolution of this domestic
issue." 48 Public school segregation itself had been "the subject of
much adverse press comment" in those nations the United States
49
was "trying to keep in the democratic camp," calling into question "how such a practice can exist in a country which professes
50
to be a staunch supporter of freedom, justice, and democracy. "
Other aspects of the record reinforced the primacy of desegregation to the Cold War. At the trial level, Judge Waties
Waring, dissenting from a decision that upheld segregated
schools in Clarendon County, South Carolina, noted the "clear
and important" consequences of racial segregation, "particularly
at [a] time when our national leaders are called upon to show to
the world that our democracy means what it says and that it is a
true democracy and there is no under-cover suppression of the
rights of any of our citizens because of the pigmentation of their
skins." 51
In both their personal and professional capacities, the Justices articulated anxiety about the looming Cold War crisis. In a
speech to the American Bar Association just one month after
Brown was decided, Chief Justice Earl Warren stated that
American democracy was on trial "at home and abroad," and
52
acknowledged the Court's role in shaping public policy. Justice
Douglas traveled to both India and Pakistan in the early 1950s
and upon his return wrote about the ideological conflicts present
in the Cold War and how domestic racism strained the United
States' relationship with those nations. 53 In 1951, Justice Frankfurter took "judicial notice" of ascending "communist doctrines ... in powerful nations who cannot be acquitted of unfriendliness to the institutions of this country." 54 One year later,
48. Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and for Resp'ts in No. 10 on Reargument
at 194, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter NAACP Brief], reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 43, at 514, 707; see also Bergin, supra note
19, at 409.
49. Brief on Behalf of Am. Civil Liberties Union et at. as Amici Curiae at 28,
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 [hereinafter ACLU Brief), reprinted in 49
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 43, at 156, 183; see also Bergin, supra note 19, at 410.
50. DOJ Brief at 8, supra note 44, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 43,
at 123; see also Bergin, supra note 19, at 410.
51. Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529, 548 (E.D.S.C. 1951) (Waring, J., dissenting).
52. See DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CiVIL RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 106. Subsequent to
Brown, Chief Justice Warren recalled the contradictions between America's "egalitarian
rhetoric" following World War II and the presence of segregation as a significant influence on the course of racial progress. See Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 494-95.
53. See WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, BEYOND THE HIGH HIMALAYAS 317, 321-23
(1953); WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, STRANGE LANDS AND FRIENDLY PEOPLE 296 (1951).
54. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 547 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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Justices Reed and Minton acknowledged the "terrifying global
conflict" arising out of the Cold War, which for them warranted
judicial deference to Executive priorities. 55 These concerns undoubtedly influenced the weight given to the Cold War arguments in Brown.
The Cold War is also responsible, at least in part, for the
fact that Brown was a unanimous opinion. After hearing oral arguments, Justice Stanley Reed maintained his original defense of
the "separate but equal" standard announced in Plessy and cast
a tentative vote favoring the South during an early judicial con56
ference on Brown. Justice Reed knew that earlier decisions rejecting segregation in law schools, graduate institutions, and public train-cars expressly declined to regeal the authority of states
to segregate other public institutions. He read this precedent as
direct authority for upholding segregated public schools. 58 Moreover, unlike many of his colleagues, Reed was a committed segregationist with absolutely no personal investment in pressing
the cause of Black equality. 59
At the same time, Reed's initial commitment to segregation
in Brown clashed with an overwhelming deference to the Executive Branch, particularly on matters involving international affairs.60 A growing concern over America's position in the Cold
War and the Soviet Union's military dominance is evident in his
voting record as well as discussions he had with his law clerk. 61 In
fact, Reed is the only Justice known to have investigated on at
least two occasions whether other nations permitted racial seg62
regation under their own legal systems. Though Reed never ar55. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,668-69 (1952) (Vinson,
C.J., & Reed, Minton, JJ., dissenting).
56. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD
OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 695-96 (2004)
(1976).
57. See, e.g., Henderson v. U.S., 339 U.S. 816 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
58. See Bergin, supra note 19, at 420-22.
59. Though Reed was generally credited with an amiable personality, his position
on racial issues earned him a reputation among the Court's law clerks for being "thick
headed," "ruthless," and "anti-black." See JOHN D. FASSETT, NEW DEAL JUSTICE: THE
LIFE OF STANLEY REED OF KENTUCKY 359 (1st ed. 1994) [hereinafter FASSETT, NEW
DEAL JUSTICE]; see also Bergin, supra note 19, at 411-14 (describing Reed's reaction to
desegregation decisions and personal interactions with Blacks).
60. See Bergin, supra note 19, at 432-37.
61. See id. at 427-29.
62. See John D. Fassett, Mr. Justice Reed and Brown v. the Board of Education,
THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY 1986 YEARBOOK 48 [hereinafter Fassett, Mr.
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ticulated precisely why he abandoned his dissent, 63 Chief Justice
Warren asked him just prior to his a final vote with the majority
whether he thought a fractured decision was "really the best
thing for the country." 64 Reed also admitted to his clerk that "the
attitude of the rest of the world toward segregation is worthy of
consideration. "65
Cold War security concerns that reached a peak at midcentury created a moment of interest-convergence that made
Brown possible. Prior to 1954, the Court re!;?eatedly rejected requests by the NAACP to over-rule Plessy, 6 adopting instead a
piecemeal approach that relied on rules of statutory construction
and dormant commerce clause principles to end segregation
when it interfered with the economics of trade and transportation.67 Decisions involving the Equal Protection Clause carefully
re-affirmed the "separate but equal" doctrine and required desegregation only when Black and White facilities could not be
68
matched. Brown, however, was different. Public school desegregation would shake not only the daily habits and routines of 11
Justice Reed], available at http://www.supremecourthistory.org/04_1ibrary/subs_volumes
/04_c18_k.html.
63. Justice Reed explained his vote in Brown to Justice Felix Frankfurter by stating
only that the considerations favoring segregation '"did not add up to a balance against
the Court's opinion,' and that 'the factors looking toward fair treatment for Negroes are
more important than the weight of history."' See Bergin, supra note 19, at 426 (quoting
Fassett, Mr. Justice Reed, supra note 62, at 63).
64. See KLUGER, supra note 56, at 702.
65. FASSETT, NEW DEAL JUSTICE, supra note 59, at 571-72; Fassett, Mr. Justice
Reed, supra note 62, at 54; see also KLUGER, supra note 56, at 696.
66. See ROBERT J. COTTROL, ET AL., BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: CASTE,
CULTURE, AND THE CONSTITUTION 101-13 (2003) (discussing the legal strategy in preBrown desegregation cases); see also TUSHNET, LEGAL STRATEGY, supra note 31, at
126-32.
67. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100 (1953);
Henderson v. U.S., 339 U.S. 816 (1950); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946);
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 217-23 (2004). Professor Bell would characterize these decisions as classic examples of interest convergence that provided relief from
racial injustice only to the extent it benefited Whites. They permitted transitory interactions to the benefit of White commercial interests, but maintained more significant social
barriers, including public school segregation and bans on inter-racial relationships, that
preserved the myth of White purity and reality of White privilege. See DERRICK BELL,
FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 7 (1992) ("When
whites perceive that it will be profitable or at least cost-free to serve, hire, admit, or otherwise deal with blacks on a nondiscriminatory basis, they do so. When they fearaccurately or not-that there may be a loss, inconvenience, or upset to themselves or
other whites, discriminatory conduct usually follows.") [hereinafter BELL, FACES AT THE
BOTTOM].
68. See e.g, McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637
(1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). On the limits of these cases, see ED CRAY,
CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 276 (1997).
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million Southern school children, but the very foundation of
White separatism and superiority upon which the South ordered
69
its society. The Court was not willing to disrupt that order until
Cold War security interests came to the fore. From this perspective, Brown might register as a loss because it ultimately failed to
bring about meaningful racial or educational reform. Brown
failed to bring about meaningful reform because that was never
its goal.
C. RACIAL-SACRIFICE FOLLOWING BROWN

The interests that converged in Brown resulted in a key
ideological advantage to the United States over the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War. 70 Brown's immediate impact
on the racial composition of public schools, however, was negligible. Local, state and federal lawmakers actively subverted
Brown's constitutional mandate in full view of the Court which
for the most part remained on the side-lines until nearly a full
71
decade had passed. Racial fortuity thus came full circle in
Brown, Professor Bell concludes, as government actors sacrificed the constitutional entitlements and educational rights of
Black school children in order to maintain pre-Brown levels of
segregation (pp. 71-72, 94--95).

69. Southern Whites feared that integrated schools would inevitably lead to interracial friendships and ultimately sexual relationships between Black and White adolescents that would threaten the myth of White racial purity that supported claims to White
privilege. The symbolic association between integrated schools and inter-racial sex was
violently captured in 1957 when six Birmingham, Alabama Klansmen castrated a Black
man after taunting him for "think[ing] nigger kids should go to school with [white] kids."
See KLARMAN, supra note 67, at 424 (alteration in original).
70. The United States Information Agency and world-wide news outlets communicated the outcome of Brown to audiences across the globe. See Mary L. Dudziak, The
Little Rock Crisis, and Foreign Affairs: Race, Resistance and the Image of American Democracy, 70S. CAL. L. REV. 1641, 1644-45 (1997); Dudziak, Cold War Imperative, supra
note 32, at 112-14.
71. The difficulty in obtaining progress towards desegregation after Brown is well
documented and analyzed. While some scholars place primary responsibility on the judiciary, others cite the lack of support for the decision from the legislative and executive
departments. Compare Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of
American Public Education: The Courts' Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1600 (2003)
("[C]ourts could have done much more to bring about desegregation, and instead, the
judiciary has created substantial obstacles to remedying the legacy of racial segregation
in schools."), with Gerald N. Rosenberg, Tilting at Windmills: Brown II and the Hopeless
Quest to Resolve Deep-Seated Social Conflict Through Litigation, 24 LAW & INEQ. 31,45
(2006) ("Because the political support necessary to dismantle the apartheid system was
lacking in 1955, it would not have mattered what standard the Court adopted.").
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The seeds of racial sacrifice were planted even prior to the
announcement of Brown, when a number of Justices voiced concern during the Court's judicial conferences for the impact desegregation would have on Whites. No matter how irrational
"prosegregation emotion," Justice Jackson wrote, "we can
hardly deny the existence of sincerity and passion of those who
think that their blood, birth and lineage are something worthy of
protection by separatism."72 Justice Reed was even more solicitous, urging the Court to "start with the idea that there is a large
and reasonable body of opinion in various states that separation
73
of the races is for the benefit of both. " The record suggests that
several Justices agreed to strike down segregation on the condition that Chief Justice Warren draft an opinion that did not re74
quire immediate implementation from the South.
As such, the Court ruled segregated schools unconstitutional in 1954 but waited a full year before announcing a remedial decree that established the "all deliberate speed" standard
75
of compliance. The decree instructed local school boards to
make a "prompt and reasonable start" towards full desegregation,76 but district courts charged with monitoring compliance
were never told when desegregation should begin, when it
should end, or what pace of progress to demand in between."
They were instead instructed to move cautiously and authorized
to interrupt a desegregation glan once it began if circumstances
8
warranted "additional time." The Justices hoped this coolin~
off period would induce voluntary compliance from the South,
but only prolonged delay by relinquishing oversight to "the most
recalcitrant judge and the most defiant school board. "80

72. See KLUGER, supra note 56, at 693.
73. See CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS, supra note 42, at 649.
74. See KLUGER, supra note 56, at 698.
75. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,301 (1955).
76. !d. at 300.
77. See id.
78. !d.
79. See James E. Pfander, Brown II: Ordinary Remedies for Extraordinary Wrongs,
24LAW & INEQ. 47, 49-52 (2006) (citing institutional limitations amid predictable oppoSitiOn from the South among reasons why the Court adopted the "all deliberate speed"
standard).
80. See J. W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL
JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 55 (1971); see also CHARLES J. OGLETREE, ALL
DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION 11 (1st ed. 2004) ("Even though the Court's ruling was unanimous, Its reluctance to take a more forceful position on ending segregation immediately
played mto the hands of the integration opponents.").
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Immediately after Brown, the Court let stand a series of district court judgments that distinguished between "integration"
and "desegregation" by recognizing a right of White school children to avoid compulsory integration with Blacks. Brown, the
lower courts agreed, "does not require integration. It merely
81
forbids discrimination. " In did not prevent Whites from keeping themselves apart from Blacks, but only prohibited the government from requiring them to do so. One district judge in
Texas reasoned that if Black children experienced a psychological injury "by not being allowed to sit in white classes in the
school room," as was presumed in Brown, then White children
necessarily suffered an "inferiority complex" when "required to
sit in classes with the colored child." 82 The distinction between
"desegregation" and "integration" established in these cases led
to the proliferation of "freedom of choice" plans, transfer provisions and other measures that maintained actual segregation
while purporting to comply with Brown. 83
Judicial inertia on the part of the Supreme Court emboldened White resistance even to nominal desegregation. In 1958,
Arkansas governor Orval Faubus dispatched national guard
troops to obstruct a district order that permitted nine Black
school children to enroll in Little Rock's Central High School (p.
95). A cadre of angry whites stood in for the troops when they
were called off, resulting in a melee that required the dispatch of
federal guards. The event came to symbolize the South's steadfast opposition to Brown, until it was overshadowed by fire-hose
and canine attacks on peaceful civil rights demonstrators and the
murder of four young Black girls in the bombing of a Birmingham, Alabama Baptist Church. 84 In response to Faubus, the
Court affirmed the formal constitutional obligation of states to
comply with federallaw, 85 but declined to scrutinize the overall
lack of progress in the South. Enforcement of Brown was so lax
that by 1964 just over one percent of Black students in the 11

81. Briggs v. Elliot, 132 F. Supp. 776,777 (E. D. S.C. 1955).
82. Borders v. Rippy, 188 F. Supp. 231,232 (E.D. Tex. 1960) (emphasis added).
83. See, e.g., Covington v. Edwards, 264 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1959); Kelly v. Board of
Educ., 270 F.2d 209, 228-29 (6th Cir. 1959); Jackson v. School Bd., 203 F. Supp. 701, 706
(W.D. Va. 1962). Some courts went so far as to uphold outright segregation even after
Brown based on the supposed psychological instability and intellectual deficiencies of
Black school children. See Stell v. Savannah Chatham-County Bd. of Educ., 220 F. Supp.
667, 683 (S.D. Ga. 1963).
84. See KLARMAN, supra note 67, at 430--41.
85. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1958).
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states of the old confederacy attended school with Whites (p.
96).
Racial fanaticism in response to Brown ultimately provided
the catalyst for federal legislative intervention. Regional unrest
brought a halt to tourism in the South, causing business owners
to demand a federal response. 86 So did moderate Whites in the
North who, safe on the side-lines up to that point, saw the brutal
backlash to Brown as a repulsive and dangerous threat to the nation's domestic security. (p. 7). 87 Pressured into action, Congress
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to outlaw racial discrimina88
tion in employment, housing and public accommodations. Title
VI specifically outlawed segre~ation in federally funded institutions including public schools. In 1965, Congress promised billions in federal school aid under the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act,90 while executive guidelines conditioned funding
on proof that local schools in fact improved the racial composi91
tion of their student bodies (pp. 96-97).
Federal efforts to buy compliance with Brown provided the
Court with leverage to wield against resistant school districts
(pp. 107-09). In 1968, it abandoned the "all deliberate speed"
standard by demanding that school boards "come forward with a
plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now." 92 It extended district court supervision to
student transportation, teacher hiring, facilities construction and
other aspects of school operations.93 Three years later it authorized district courts to establish racial balancing targets, alter at94
tendance zones, and initiate bussing. Segregation was so entrenched in some jurisdictions that "administratively awkward,
inconvenient, and even bizarre" remedies might be necessary to
eliminate a "dual" school system, the Court said. 95 Thus cooperation between the legislative, executive and judicial departments
86. See Rosenberg, supra note 71, at 40.
87. See also KLARMAN, supra note 67, at 441-42.
88. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964).
89. 42
§§ 2000d-2000d-4 (1964).
90. See 20 U.S. C.§§ 6301 (1965).
91. See also Jeffrey A. Raffel, History of School Desegregation, in SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 17, 25-26 (Rossell et al. eds, 2002); Bradley W.
Joondeph, A Second Redemption?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 169,223 (1999) (reviewing
GARY 0RFIELD ET AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCA T/ON (1996).
92. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
93. See id. at 435.
94. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22-30 (1971).
95. See id. at 28.

u.s.c.

288

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 23:271

increased the percentage of Black students attending White
schools exponentially. By 1988, the South had become the most
integrated region in the country. 96
These gains were ultimately short lived, however. Bussing
measures and district consolidation schemes used to desegregate
urban schools pushed White families further into the suburbs
where discriminatory lending and real estate practices kept the
neighborhoods, and by default the neighborhood schools, comfortably White (pp. 109-11). Though White flight was, and continues to be, a primary cause of segregation between urban and
suburban school districts in large metropolitan regions, 97 interdistrict desegregation remedies are permitted only if Black and
White students were forced by law to enroll in different districts,
or the racially discriminatory acts of one district formally caused
segregation in another. 98 This rationale reflects the "states
rights" philosophy of those Justices appointed to the bench after
Brown, and has been criticized for drawing an artificial distinction between "de jure," or forced racial segregation on the one
hand, and "de facto" or supposedly voluntary racial separation
on the other.99 Indeed, apart from race-based school assignments, the decision to locate a school deep within a racially identifiable neighborhood all but guarantees continued educational
•
100
segregatiOn.
During this same period, the Court, despite the national importance of education cited in Brown, declined to recognize it as
a "fundamental right," which would have required states to rem-

96. See Michal R. Belknap, The Real Significance of Brown v. Board of Education:
The Genesis of the Warren Court's Quest for Equality, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 863, 873
(2004).
97. In 1992, for instance, the Court alluded to the consequences of White flight by
noting that "racially stable neighborhoods are not likely to emerge because whites prefer
a racial mix of 80% white and 20% black, while blacks prefer a 50-50 mix." Freeman v.
Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 495 (1992). Even within school districts, "young middle-class white
families have successfully been pressuring their school boards to carve out almost entirely separate provinces of education for their children." JONATHAN KozoL, THE
SHAME OF THE NATION: THE RESTORATION OF APARTHEID SCHOOLING IN AMERICA
135 (1st ed. 2005); see also Alfred A. Lindseth, Legal Issues Related to School Funding/Desegregation, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 91,
at 41, 46.
98. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,744-45 (1974).
99. See id. at 761-62 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
100. Jd. at 761 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also id. at 785 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("Exacerbating the effects of extensive residential segregation between Negroes and
whites, the school board consciously drew attendance zones along lines which maximized
!he segregation of the races in schools as well.").
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edy funding disparities between urban and suburban school districts.101 Additional setbacks continued into the 1990s (pp. 12629),102 beginning with the Court's 1991 decision that the Oklahoma City School District might be released from its obligations
under a court ordered desegregation plan, before actually integratinJ a number of heavily segregated schools within the district.1 Judicial decrees "are not intended to operate in perpetuity,"104 the Court explained, which meant that a school district
earned release from judicial oversight once "good faith" compliance with a court order eliminated segregation "to the extent
practicable. " 105 School districts are no longer required to eliminate segregation in fact.
The following year, the Court authorized district courts to
suspend a desegregation decree in incremental stages before a
school district demonstrated full compliance in all other areas of
school operations. 106 Together, these concessions all but preclude
relief for existing segregation or that which promises to reappear
once an order is lifted. When that occurs, plaintiffs can no longer
petition a district court for a rehearing, but must initiate an entirely new lawsuit and meet the nearly impossible burden of producing contemporary evidence of racial intent in order to renew
judicial oversight (p. 126). 107 Moreover, these decisions acknowledged the connection between educational segregation and segregated housing patterns but declined to compel a remedy for
this mutually reinforcing phenomenon. 108
101. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973).
102. The Court's most recent desegregation decisions have been criticized for enabling school districts to return to a state of effective racial segregation. See, e.g., KEVIN
BROWN, RACE, LAW AND EDUCATION IN THE POST-DESEGREGATION ERA: FOUR
PERSPECTIVES ON DESEGREGATION AND RESEGREGATION 205-22 (2005); PETER
IRONS, JIM CROW'S CHILDREN: THE BROKEN PROMISE OF THE BROWN DECISION 25988 (2004); Chemerinsky, supra note 71, at 1615-19; Bryan K. Fair, The Anatomy of
American Caste, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 381, 403-05 (1999).
103. Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237,242-44 (1991).
104. !d. at 248.
105. !d. at 249-50.
106. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,489 (1992).
107. See also Fair, supra note 102, at 404.
108. See, e.g., Freeman, 503 U.S. at 494 ("Once the racial imbalance due to the de
jure violation has been remedied, the school district is under no duty to remedy imbalance that is caused by demographic factors.") (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ. 402 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1971)). This rationale continued to create dissention
among the Justices. See id. at 514 (Biackmun, J., concurring) (noting how the "placement
of new schools and closure of old schools and programs such as magnet classrooms and
majority-to-minority ... transfer policies affect the racial composition of the schools.");
Dowell, 498 U.S. at 255 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The [student reassignment plan] supenmposed attendance zones over some residentially segregated areas. As a result, considerable racial imbalance reemerged in 33 of 64 elementary schools in the Oklahoma
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Finally, in 1995, the Court ruled that a district court could
not force school officials in an urban district to implement educational improvements for the;urpose of attracting Whites students from suburban districts. 1 Years of unconstitutional segregation produced stark racial disparities in school enrollment and
student performance within Kansas City, Missouri. Because the
district itself was predominately Black, however, a judicial order
that reshuffled students to different schools within the district
would have only reproduced those disparities. 110 The district
court thus ordered law makers to initiate salary increases, capital
improvements, and curriculum enrichments to improve the educational quality of Kansas City schools with the hopes of encouraging voluntary enrollment from Whites in suburban districts.lll
Not a single White student from surrounding suburban districts
was forced to do so under the court's order. Still, the Supreme
Court rejected that approach, holding that the very purpose of
encouraging enrollment from Whites in suburban districts qualified as an "interdistrict goal" that exceeded the scope of Kansas
City's "intradistrict violation." 112
The history of desegregation litigation presaged the unfortunate reality of continuing school segregation today. A report
by the Harvard Civil Rights Project summarizing data from 2001
concluded that public schools were more raciallf segregated in
11
2001 than at any time in the previous 30 years. A later report
found that, for minority students, effective schools are as rare as
integrated ones, with "devastating poverty, limited resources,
and various social and health problems" concentrated in over-

City system with student bodies either greater than 90% Afro· American or greater than
90% non-Afro-American.").
109. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
110. !d. at 76.
111. !d. at 76-78.
112. !d. at 92.
113. See Erica Frankenberg, Chungmei Lee & Gary Orfield, A Multiracial Society with
Segregated Schools: Are We Losing the Dream? 6 (The Gvil Rights Project, Jan. 2003), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edulresearch!reseg03/AreWeLosingtheDrearn.
pdf. See also Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Brown at 50: King's Dream or Plessy's
Nightmare
4
(The
Civil
Rights
Project,
Jan.
2004),
available
at
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/researchlreseg04/brown50.pdf ("For more than
a decade, we have been headed backward toward greater segregation for black students.
For Latinos, who have recently become the largest group of minority students, segregation has been steadily increasing ever since the first national data were collected in the
late 1960s."). "[A]s of the 2000-2001 school year, white students, on average, a~tended
schools where 80 percent of the student body was white. Minority students were mcreasingly attending schools that were virtually nonwhite" (p. 127).
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114

whelmingly non-White schools (p. 127). In the few schools that
are racially diverse, suspiciously vague tracking criteria and ability grouping reproduce Ratterns of racial isolation within the
classroom (pp. 112-13). 5 For Professor Bell, racial sacrifice
played a role in bringing about the unfortunate circumstances
that render America's public schools both separate and unequal,
and consequently unable to demonstrate compliance with Plessy
much less Brown.
III. SITUATING BROWN WITHIN A HISTORY OF
RACIAL FORTUITY
Silent Covenants places Brown on a continuum of events
that demonstrate the role of racial fortuity in governmental decision-making (pp. 29-48). This Part examines three events in particular: the abolition of slavery in the North, the Emancipation
Proclamation, and the approval of diversity-based admissions
programs. 116 The motivations for these events and the set-backs
that followed them support Professor Bell's conclusion that the
"perceived self-interest by whites rather than the racial injustices
suffered by blacks has been the major motivation in racialremediation policies" (p. 59).

114. See also Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Why Segregation Matters: Poverty and
Educational Inequality 16 (The Civil Rights Project, Jan. 2005), available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/Why_Segreg_Matters.pdf ("The
reality of segregation by race and poverty means that, while the majority of white students attend middle class schools, minority students in racially segregated schools are
very likely attending a school of concentrated poverty.").
115. See also Mildred Wingfall Robinson, Brown: Why We Must Remember, 89
MARQ. L. REV. 53, 54 (2005) ("General tracking, a practice that theoretically allows a
match between student ability and level of instruction, still all too often separates children by color[, as do) programs for the gifted, for those with learning challenges, and for
those for whom English is a second language.").
116. Professor Bell distinguishes between incidents that reflect "racial sacrifice" and
those that concern "interest-convergence," though the combined influence of "racial fortuity" generally is visible in each episode he describes. In addition to the three incidents
discussed in this Essay, Professor Bell examines the cyclical patterns of reform and retreat in the Constitution's slavery compromise, universal White male suffrage, the Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), the
Hayes-Tilden Compromise, the Southern Disenfranchisement Compromise, the death
penalty, criminal sentencing disparities, unemployment measures and housing patterns
(pp. 29-48). See also Liyah Kaprice Brown, Officer or Overseer?: Why Police Desegregation Fails as an Adequate Solution to Racist, Oppressive, and Violent Policing in Black
Communities, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 757, 780 (2005) (citing principles of
racial fortuity to explain why systemic police brutality against people of color goes unremcdied).
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A. RACIAL FORTUITY INN ORTHERN EMANCIPATION

Alexis De Tocqueville observed in 1835 that "[s]lavery in
the United States [was] destroyed in the interest, not of the Ne117
groes, but of the whites. " This early application of racial fortuity was evident in the North as well as the South. Prior to the
Revolutionary War, slavery took root in New Jersey, New York
and Massachusetts as a means of labor production to support the
emerging colonies. 118 Other colonies also experimented with
slavery, but regional industrialization and an expanding surplus
of White laborers prevented the institution from becoming the
economic necessity it was in the agrarian South. 119 The struggle
against British tyranny also made it difficult for those Whites
who did own slaves to rationalize a claim to ownership in human
120
a point emphasized in abolitionist literature and
flesh,
speeches. 121 Moreover, White workers campaigned against slavery on the ground that it interfered with their own opportunities
for paid labor, while politicians complained that it reduced the
colonies' prestige among European nations. 122 These were the
primary economic and political conditions that induced abolition
in the North prior to the Civil War.
Lawmakers nonetheless delayed freedom for Blacks out of
concern for the financial interests of Whites. Professor Bell cites
a 1780 Pennsylvania statute that made every child born to a slave
an "indentured servant" to their parent's master until the age of
28 (p. 51). 123 Other states required slaves to complete a term of
indentured servitude to compensate owners for their "fair market value" (p. 51). New York established a voluntary emancipation scheme, offering slave-owners 500 acres of land in exchange
124
for a slave they surrendered to the Revolutionary Army. Free117. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 403 (Gerald E. Bevan
trans., 2003).
118. See LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE
STATES, 1790-1860, at3--4 (1961).
119. See, e.g., A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND
THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 98 (1978).
120. See LITWACK, supra note 118, at 8.
121. See BENJAMIN QUARLES, THE NEGRO IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 43-50
(1961).
122. See LITWACK, supra note 118, at 5-9.
123. See also Paul Finkelman, The Dragon St. George Could Not Slay: Tucker's Plan
to End Slavery, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1213, 1231 (2006) (comparing rationale for
gradual emancipation statutes in Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Connecticut with racial
ideology that precluded emancipation in Virginia).
124. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 119, at 138.
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dom in the North was hardly free. Nor did it guarantee Blacks
equality with Whites. Most colonies restricted the property, voting, and marriage rights of free Blacks during and after abolition
125
to confirm their subordinate status to Whites.
B. RACIAL FORTUITY IN LINCOLN'S EMANCIPATION

Professor Bell also evaluates the Emancipation Proclamation in terms of racial fortuity (pp. 52-57). Despite a strong personal conviction against slavery, as President, Abraham Lincoln
declined to interfere with the institution for fear of provoking
further rebellion in the South (p. 53). Lincoln did not view
emancipation as a moral imperative, but '"a practical war measure to be decided upon according to the advantages or disadvan126
tages it may offer to the suppression of the rebellion. "' In his
famous response to abolitionist Horace Greely, Lincoln defended his ambivalence:
My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and
is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the
Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could
save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could
save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also
do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do
because I believe it helps to save the Union. I shall do less
whenever I shall believe that what I am doing hurts the cause,
and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will
help the cause (p. 53).

Military necessity ultimately prompted Lincoln to draft the
Emancipation Proclamation in 1862. The war "had gone from
bad to worse," he later explained, "we had about played our last
card, and must change our tactics, or lose the game!" 127 He wagered on "fre~dom to the slaves in the South for the purpose of
hastening the end of the war. " 128 It paid off. The measure provided a steady stream of Black reinforcements for Union troops
and destabilized the southern agrarian economy by draining it of
slave labor (pp. 54-55). It also gave foreign abolitionist governments a reason to withhold political and financial support from
the Confederacy (p. 54). 129 These political objectives tipped the
125. See id. at 139, 148, 286; LITWACK, supra note 118, at 64-152.
126. P. 54 (quoting Irving Dilliard, The Emancipation Proclamation in the Perspective of Time, 23 LAW IN TRANSITION 95,98 (1963)).
127. See JOHN HOPE fRANKLIN, THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION 31 (1995).
128. See id. at 32.
129. See also PHILLIP SHAW PALUDAN, THE PRESIDENCY OF ABRAHAM LiNCOLN
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scales in favor of emancipation long before it could have been
sold on the premise of human dignity alone.
C. RACIAL FORTUITY IN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

The benefits of diversity based affirmative action programs
are also fortuitous, says Professor Bell (pp. 138-59). Gruffer v.
Bollinger upheld the admissions program at the University of
Michigan Law School, which considered an applicant's race
along with other variables in order to promote diversity among
the entering class. 130 More than 300 organizations signed amicus
briefs in support of the law school, including academics, labor
unions, Fortune 500 companies, and retired military and civilian
defense officials, arguing that racial diversity constituted a
"compelling" government interest (p. 148). 131 A majority of the
Court adopted their position that diversity promotes "crossracial understanding," advances "learning outcomes," and prepares students for an "increasingly diverse workforce and society."132 It also agreed with the opinion of high ranking officers
and civilian military leaders that a "'highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps ... is essential to the military's ability to fulfill
its principle mission to provide national security."' 133 Diversitybased education programs also open "the path to leadership," it
said, which ultimately produced "a set of leaders with legitimacy
134
in the eyes of the citizenry. "
This rationale is influenced by the role of racial fortuity.
The Court had previously characterized race-based remedies as
a "highly suspect tool" even when used to counter the effects of
documented discrimination, 135 and rejected the use of racefriendly hiring incentives as a remedy for nation-wide discrimi136
nation against minority-owned small businesses. Gruffer made
147 (1994). But see ALLEN C. GUELZO, LiNCOLN'S EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION:
THE END OF SLAVERY IN AMERICA 9 (2004) (arguing that Emancipation entailed political disadvantages that Lincoln understood).
130. 539 u.s. 306,337-39 (2003).
131. /d. at 330--31.
132. /d. at 330.
133. /d. at 331 (quoting Brief for Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al. as Amici Curiae at 5).
134. /d. at 332.
135. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (citing City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989)).
136. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 504 (1989) (holding that the national trend of discrimination in the construction industry as identified by Congress did not justify hiring incentives offered by City of Richmond to promote municipal contracting opportunities for
minority businesses).
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no attempt to identify, much less purge, the systemic influence of
such discrimination, says Bell. Instead, it was "[ d]iversity in the
classroom, the work floor, and the military, not the need to address past and continuing racial barriers" that gained the Court's
approval (p. 151).
The plan in Grutter not only favored the interests of corporate entities and government elites, it also mitigated any adverse
impact on White applicants-a particular concern for Justice
O'Connor, who cast the deciding vote and authored the majority
opinion. 137 The admissions committee undertook a "highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file" to determine
whether non-traditional Whites, in addition to racial minorities,
might enhance the broad-based diversity of the entering class.m
O'Connor thought it significant that the law school routinely
admitted White candidates with grades and test scores lower
than Black, Hispanic and other minority candidates that were rejected.139 This set the Law School apart from the University of
Michigan's undergraduate institution which allocated a fixed
number of diversity "bonuses" to every underrepresented minority applicant. 140 O'Connor's vote in Gratz v. Bollinger sealed
the fate of that program too, which impermissibly made '"the
factor of race ... decisive' for virtually every minimally qualified
141
underrepresented minority applicant. " The whims of racial fortuity thus dictate the constitutionality of affirmative action programs according to their ephemeral value to Whites (p. 159).
IV. RECKONING WITH RACIAL FORTUITY
Silent Covenant compels racial justice advocates to consider
the costs of fortuitous progress before conceding its benefits.
First, as described by Professor Bell, racial fortuity requires that
people of color submit to serious and long-term injustices until
intervening factors compel change (pp. 69-72). Second, fortuitous relief is temporary and subject to shifting policy priorities
because it ignores the underlying ideological root of racial preju137. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 276, 287 (1986) (O'Connor, 1.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (warning that race-based remedies for statutory
discrimination violation must "not impose disproportionate harm on the interests, or unnecessarily trammel the rights, of innocent individuals directly and adversely affected by
a plan's racial preferences").
138. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337.
139. !d. at 338.
140. /d. at 337 (citing Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)).
141. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 272 (alteration in original).
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dice that breeds continuing inequality (pp. 71-72). Moreover,
fortuitous progress does not address how lawmakers leverage racial tension in support of policies that undermine the economic
interests of poor and working-class Whites, and therefore perpetuate resentment and hostility from those groups towards any
measure of reform (p. 79).
These drawbacks to racial fortuity are visible in the three
episodes described in Part III. Specifically, Black Africans endured up to a century of enslavement in the North and more
than two centuries in the South before utilitarian motive led to
emancipation. Lincoln himself spoke eloquently against slavery's
brutality 142 but reversed regional emancipation orders issued by
Union field commanders in occupied areas of the South (p. 53).
He supported gradual abolition, compensation for Whites, and
deportment of African descendants more than 200 years after
they and their families had been dismantled and dispersed across
143
the American continent. Pragmatic motives also led the Court
in Grutter to affirm the social, economic, and strategic benefits of
integrated schools-the same benefits attributed to desegregation in Brown 144 -after previously rejecting race-friendly programs that acknowledged and sought to remedy documented
145
discrimination against people of color.
Fortuitous racial progress under these conditions legitimizes
more formidable barriers to opportunity and obscures the role of
racial animus or indifference in maintaining those barriers.
Brown itself promoted equality by pronouncement, Professor
Bell states, when it defined "separate" to be "unequal" without
once mentionin~ the pernicious ideological foundation of segregation (p. 196). 1 White lawmakers could simply repeal segrega142. See, e.g., GUELZO, supra note 129, at 4 ("I hate (slavery] because of the monstrous injustice of slavery itself(,] ... because it deprives our republican example of its
just influence in the world-enables the enemies of free institutions, with plausibility, to
taunt us as hypocrites .... "); 8 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 1953, 361 (1953) ("Whenever (I] hear any one, arguing for slavery I
feel a strong impulse to see it tried on him personally.") (alteration in original) (citation
omitted); Dilliard, supra note 126, at 96 ("If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong. I can
not remember when I did not so think and feel." (quoting Letter from Lincoln to A.G.
Hodges (Apr. 4, 1864), in 10 COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LiNCOLN 65 (Gettysburg
ed. 1905))).
143. See PALUDAN, supra note 129, at 130-31.
144. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954).
145. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989).
146. See also Juan F. Perea, Buscanda America: Why Integration and Equal Protection Fail to Protect Latinos, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1426 (2004) ("Brown and its subsequent enforcement as integration, without repudiation of the White racism that caused
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tion statutes, proclaim the neutrality of government rules, and
spin the continuance of economic and political subordination of
147
people of color after Brown into proof of racial inferiority. The
decision thus legitimized continuing racial oppression in public
schools and other institutions that, for the most part, remained
separate, unequal, and racially toxic long after Brown.
Similarly, emancipation provided much needed relief from
the evils of chattel bondage, but it came after two and a half centuries of slavery and did nothing to exorcise the myth of Black
inferiority that gave birth to Jim Crow. 148 So, too, Grutter is
viewed by many as an affirmative action victory despite the near
universal reliance on standardized test scores, legacy preferences, and other arbitrary criteria that disadvantage minority
applicants to a far greater degree than they could ever hope to
149
benefit under race-based affirmative action. Legal precedent
makes it impossible to challenge these deceptive~ neutral ad1
mission criteria without proof of racial "intent. " This is true
even in the case of standardized tests that statistically fail to predict an applicant's educational competence or likelihood of professional success. 151 Even Justice Thomas, whose dissent in Grutter decried the use of "unseemly" admission standards that

segregation, dealt only with the symptom, and not the cause, of racial inequality.").
147. See Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 717
(1992).
148. See CHARLES FRANK ROBINSON, DANGEROUS LIASONS: SEX AND LOVE IN
THE SEGREGATED SOUTH 50 (2003) (noting how segregation statutes "symbolized the
intention of whites to maintain a racial separateness that supported the notion of white
supremacy"); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 11 (3d rev.
ed. 1974) (identifying "Anglo-Saxon superiority and innate African inferiority" as "ideological roots" of segregation).
149. See D. Marvin Jones, When "Victory" Masks Retreat: The LSAT, Constitutional
Dualism, and the End of Diversity, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 15, 20 (2006) (providing statistics to demonstrate that "over-reliance upon the LSAT is the proximate cause of the systemic decline in minority enrollment" in accredited law schools); John D. Lamb, The
Real Affirmative Action Babies: Legacy Preferences at Harvard and Yale, 26 COLUM J.L.
& Soc. PROBS. 491, 504 (1993) (showing that more Whites have gained admission to
Harvard in previous years pursuant to preferences granted to the children of alumni than
the total number of Black, Hispanic, and American Indian students combined).
150. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976) (requiring proof of "invidious discriminatory purpose" before subjecting facially-neutral criteria to constitu·
tiona! scrutiny).
151. Sylvia A. Law, White Privilege and Affirmative Action, 32 AKRON L. REV. 603,
623 (1999) ("Standardized tests measure two things: the ability to take other standardized tests and economic class. We all recognize that they do not tell us whether a person
would be a good lawyer."); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Using the Master's "Tool" to Dis-

mantle His House: Why Justice Clarence Thomas Makes the Case for Affirmative Action,
47 ARIZ. L. REV. 113, 134-35 (2005) (discussing empirical studies that discount the value
of the LSAT).
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arbitrarily privilege White applicants, refused to subject raceneutral admissions criteria to constitutional scrutiny. 152
Finally, until poor and working-class Whites come to understand how lawmakers leverage racial tension to justify indiscriminate economic subordination, they will continue to oppose
even temporary and symbolic racial progress despite the many
social or political benefits they themselves derive on account of
fortuitous reform. Racism, Professor Bell explains, "has been a
powerful force fracturing the 'lower classes' and inducing large
numbers of them to think, vote, and act in defiance of what
might be expected to be their rational economic self-interest" (p.
79). It provides poor and working-class Whites "a consoling
sense of superiority and status" over Blacks, Hispanics and other
people of color with whom they share economic vulnerability,
and in turn leads them to resist racial equality even in symbolic
or temporary form. 153
The Emancipation Proclamation, for example, hastened the
end of the Civil War, but its terms applied only to areas "in rebellion against the United States" and therefore beyond the
reach of federal law (pp. 54-55). 154 The document itself was legally unenforceable in the confederacy; yet Lincoln's strategic
endorsement of freedom for Blacks cost his party significant
support among voters (p. 55). News of Lincoln's order prompted
riots against the Union draft and an untold number of beatings,
burnings and lynchings against Blacks whom Whites blamed for
the physical costs and economic hardships of war (pp. 55-56).
Emancipation may have saved the Union, but it enraged millions
of poor and working-class Whites in both the North and the
South who calculated freedom for Blacks in zero-sum terms.

152. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 368 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The
Equal Protection Clause docs not, however, prohibit the use of unseemly legacy preferences or many other kinds of arbitrary admissions procedures. What the Equal Protection Clause docs prohibit are classifications made on the basis of race."). Justice Thomas
predicted that elite educational institutions would abandon legacy preferences and other
arbitrary admissions criteria if the Court invalidated the use of race-friendly standards.
/d. at 368 n.lO.
153. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiceness as Properly, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1741-43
(1993) (identifying historically how racial status and privilege "could ameliorate and assist in 'evad(ing] rather than confront(ing] (class] exploitation"' (quoting DAVID
ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS 13 (1991))) (alteration in original).
154. A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND
PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 73--74 (1996). Legally recognized
freedom for Blacks did not occur until 1865, after the Confederacy surrendered and the
Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution was ratified. See U.S. CONST. amend XIII.
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Similarly, opposition to desegregation led significant numbers of southern Whites to dismiss the Cold War advantages of
Brown and demand through protest and violence that federal,
state and local law makers undertake to preserve segregated
schools. 155 Today, many Whites focus their energy on defeating
diversity-based admission programs when they are far more
likely to be rejected from a top institution in favor of a less qualified athlete, legacy admit, or child of a wealthy donor than a
beneficiary of affirmative action. 156 The dearth of minority students enrolled in elite institutions in itself belies any argument
that diversity programs displace Whites to any meaningful degree.157 Even race-neutral reforms are presumed to confer undeserved benefits to people of color at the expense of Whites. A
plan in Texas to automatically admit to the state's colleges and
universities every student who graduates at the top ten percent
of their high school class has come under fire by a growing number of Whites who claim that the program unjustly rewards minorities in less rigorous high schools (pp. 145-46). This position
overlooks how the program benefits poor and working-class
Whites, and especially Whites in rural areas, who would not have
been admitted to the state's most elite institutions on merit
alone. 158 Moreover, financially disadvantaged students of any
race will still encounter economic barriers to higher education
even if they earn automatic admission to the state's colleges and
universities (p. 146).

155. See KLARMAN, supra note 67, at 421-24 (discussing beatings, riots and bombings committed by angry Whites committed to forestalling desegregation in the South
following Brown).
156. The plaintiff in Grutter for example was rejected for admission despite numerical test scores and grade point averages that exceeded those of other White students who
were admitted. See 539 U.S. at 338.
157. The complexity of factors that influence admission mean that the probability for
admission of a White applicant would rise 1.5% if affirmative action were eliminated at
the most elite institutions. See WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE
RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND
UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 36 (1998). An end to diversity-based hiring programs in legal
academia would likely have as marginal an impact on White employment opportunities
given the low number of professors of color (p. 144).
158. See Onwuachi-Willig, For Whom Does the Bell Toll?, supra note 17, at 1537-38
(noting that the University of Texas at Austin had never enrolled a student from several
rural White areas prior to the Ten Percent Plan). Perceived unfairness also drives White
opposition to employer-based affirmative action programs, notwithstanding their substantial benefit to Whites. Corporate hiring campaigns to diversify the applicant pool,
without a corresponding hiring commitment, do little to counter discriminatory employment practices that disadvantage people of color, but they do increase the total number
of White applicants who can compete for opportunities that would have otherwise gone
to favored insiders (p. 141).
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V. FORGING FORTUITY WITHIN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

Silent Covenants is primarily a lesson about the practical
limits of racial fortuity. It nonetheless raises a theoretical question not directly addressed in the text, but relevant still to a
comprehensive understanding of the relationship between racial
fortuity, representative democracy, and judicial authority. Racial
fortuity not only undermines the utility of judicial advocacy as a
mechanism of racial reform, as Professor Bell recognizes, but
conflates political and judicial decision-making in a way that impugns the role of courts, especially the Supreme Court, in the
constitutional order.
An independent judiciary is meant to enforce constitutional
boundaries against breaches by the political branches-even
those sanctioned by the supposed will of the majority. 159 This includes the expedient use of race as a bargaining chip to settle
disputes among competing factions of Whites. 160 Those strategies
can be said to result from defects in the political process, including formal and informal barriers to voting and other means of
democratic participation, which limit the political influence of
Blacks and other people of color. 161 Under these circumstances,
policy priorities reflect not the reasoned will of the voting majority after accounting for minority concerns, but the self-interest of
selectively engaged constituents articulated as a commitment to
the racial status-quo. 162 The resulting legislation is precisely what
159. See Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 531, 570 (1998) (discussing historical understanding of tyranny as "the
abuse of power by government-even by representative government acting on the basis
of what a majority of its constituents wanted.").
160. The Equal Protection Clause, for instance, carries a structural as well as substantive dimension to the extent it is interpreted to justify heightened judicial review of
political policies that target a "suspect class" on account of biases likely to infect the lawmaking process. This proposition derives from the famous "Footnote 4" in United States
v. Carolene Products Co. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("[P]rejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.").
161. See LAN! GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL
FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 7-9 (1994) (noting how political majorities
have controlled the influence of racial minorities by denying them the right to vote, altering the size and structure of voting districts, and re-allocating decision-making authority
among collective lawmaking bodies once minorities assume public office).
162. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 153 (1980) ("'Race prejudice divides groups that have much in common (black
and poor whites) and unites groups (white, rich and poor) that have little else in common
than their antagonism for the racial minority. [It] provides the 'majority of the whole'
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courts are expected to scrutinize through the process of judicial
review in order to moderate the tendency towards legislative
abuse. 163 Federal judges, unlike lawmakers, operate above the
pressures of political passion, free from the coercive influence of
public accountability. This political insularity provides courts
with the capacity to defer to established principle in a way that
legislatures and the executive cannot. 164 The forces of fortuity,
however, cede the principles of constitutional decisionmaking to
the racial priorities of government, corporate or military interests, thereby impugning the central function of an independent
judiciary. Civil rights advocates might find comfort in the immediate outcome of cases like Brown and Grutter, but a judiciary
that elevates politics over principle will be quick to reverse those
gains in future case if policy priorities so dictate.
There is, however, an optimistic alternative for generating
reform within the existing constitutional framework. In the aftermath of Brown, Bell counsels civil rights advocates to rely less
on the judiciary "and more on tactics, actions, and even attitudes
that challenge the continuing assumptions of white dominance"
(p. 9). Though courts might occasionally serve as a defense
against political efforts to subordinate people of color, on this
score, "defeats are more likely than protection" (p. 189). Bell
thus asks reformers to "defy the ... involuntary sacrifices and
interest-convergence determinants" of racial practices by "forging fortuity" at the legislative level (p. 190).
Forged fortuity is meant to circumvent the perils of judicial
reform by seeking change democratically in the moments when
the interests of people of color align with the interests of Whites
(p. 190). Reformers in the 1950s forged fortuity by staging peaceful sit-ins at lunch counters in the segregated South. "The sit-ins
taught us that a great many whites would not maintain discriminatory policies if the cost was too high," Bell recalls (p. 190). He
also provides the example of William Robert Ming, a black law-

with that 'common motive to invade the rights of other citizens' that [James) Madison
believed improbable in a pluralistic society."' (quoting Frank I. Goodman, De Facto
School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CAL. L. REV. 275, 315
(1972))); see also Brown, supra note 159, at 574 ("The government is not majoritarian
and does not even come close to enabling pure majority preferences to prevail in the
policymaking process.").
163. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 25 (1962) ("(W)hen the pressure for immediate results is strong enough and emotions ride high enough, [lawmakers] will ordinarily
prefer to act on expediency rather than ... follow[] the path of principle .... ").
164. See id. at 25.
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yer from Chicago who, in the early 1960s, defended Martin Luther King, Jr. against charges that he violated Alabama's state
income tax laws by not reporting donations collected by the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference as his own personal
income. Rather than portray the charges as retaliation for King's
civil rights activities, Ming stacked the jury with White business
owners and emphasized the far reaching tax implications of the
government's argument to business interests generally. After just
four hours of deliberations, the all-White jury acquitted King of
the charges (p. 191).
Contemporary examples of forged fortuity are visible in the
work of political coalitions. Professor Michelle Allen, for example, appeals to the self-interest of Whites as a way to build
broad-based approval for public school integration which she
says receives little support when billed as a vehicle for minority
access. 165 Professor Sheryll Cashin writes about grass roots organizations that have mobilized "across the artificial lines of race
and political jurisdiction" to obtain fair and equitable tax, trans166
portation, housing and education reform. Capitalizing on selfinterest may also open government employment opportunities to
people of color in traditionally White-dominated fields. 167 The
political hegemony of White constituencies simply cannot be sustained in a pluralistic society. America's increasing diversity creates both the need and opportunity to appeal to multi-racial,
multi-lingual, multi-faith coalitions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The need to forge fortuity takes into account the unfortunate reality that racial justice is seldom made a government priority for its own sake. The strategy also is not without risk. Much
like the judiciary, the legislative and executive position on race
"ha[s] swung from unresponsive to hostile" (p. 137). Forged fortuity nonetheless presents the best likelihood for progressive reform in the face of racial resistance from Whites because it compels cooperation from a multitude of diverse constituencies,
165. See Michelle Adams, Shifting Sands: The Jurisprudence of Integration Past, Present, and Future, 47 How. L.J. 795,827-28 (2004).
166. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Shall We Overcome? Transcending Race, Class, and Ideology Through Interest Convergence, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 253,284--87 (2005).
167. See Helen Norton, Stepping Through Grutter's Open Doors: What the University
of Michigan Affirmative Action Cases Mean for Race-Conscious Government Decisionmaking, 78 TEMPLE L. REV. 543,566--69 (2005).
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including some Whites. Perhaps more importantly, forged fortuity might possibly induce the kinds of coveted long-term changes
that passive fortuity has made impossible to achieve. Social scientists have shown that orienting diverse groups of individuals
towards a common goal can reduce the impact of racial prejudice.168 Coalition building does just that, and it therefore lays the
groundwork for radically reconceptualizing a society where even
forged fortuity may no longer be necessary to protect the practical interests and constitutional guarantees of marginalized racial
groups. Thus, while Professor Bell submits evidence of racial fortuity to prove the permanence of racism (p. 78)/ 69 heeding his
call to forged fortuity may be the first step in proving him wrong.

168. See Epperson, supra note 17, at 197-200, quote at 199 (identifying benefits of
integration to include "greater toleration of, and appreciation for, members of other racial backgrounds, a greater sense of civic and political engagement, and an increased desire to live and work in multiracial settings as adults"); Lee Sigelman & Susan Welch,
The Contact Hypothesis Revisited: Black-White Interaction and Positive Racial Attitudes,
71 Soc. FORCES 781 (1993).
169. See also Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 373 (1992) ("Black
people will never gain full equality in this country. Even those herculean efforts we hail
as successful will produce no more than temporary 'peaks of progress,' short-lived victories that slide into irrelevance as racial patterns adapt in ways that maintain white dominance.") (emphasis omitted); BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 67 at ix
("(R]acism is an integral, permanent, and indestructible component of this society.:.).

